Aircraft work out where they are by listening to satellites. That signal is faint, unencrypted, and comes from 20,000 km away — and anyone with a few hundred dollars of radio gear, within a few kilometres, can broadcast a stronger fake one.
Why that is dangerous is the one mechanism worth holding on to: an autopilot holds its planned line by comparing its reported position against that line and steering to cancel the difference. A false report looks exactly like a real drift — so the correction it makes is real. The attacker never touches the aircraft. They move the report, and it flies itself to them. This is spoofing, and it has been used against shipping, aviation and drones.
Nodus Fortis is a small piece of hardware that sits in the cable between the satellite receiver and the autopilot. Everything the satellites say passes through it before the autopilot may use it. It is a gate on that one input — not a second pilot.
It carries its own motion sensors, which feel acceleration and turning directly. They never read the satellite broadcast, so faking that broadcast cannot change what they report — which is what earns them the right to judge it. A real change of place would have been felt. If it was not felt, it did not happen.
Six scenarios, about 20 seconds each. Press Play and watch one trip from A to C. Some have been shown working in simulation; one is a limit of physics no design can beat; one is what we are building toward and have not yet proved. Each says at the top which it is.